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Two recent articles, one by Vandenbroucke, Broadbent and Pearce
(henceforth VBP)1 and the other by Krieger and Davey Smith (hence-
forth KDS),2 criticize what these two sets of authors characterize as
the mainstream of the modern ‘causal inference’ school in epidemi-
ology. The criticisms made by these authors are severe; VBP label the
field both ‘wrong in theory’ and ‘wrong in practice’, and KDS—at
least in some settings—feel that the field not only ‘bark[s] up the
wrong tree’ but ‘miss[es] the forest entirely’. More specifically, the
school of thought, and the concepts and methods within it, are
painted as being applicable only to a very narrow range of investiga-
tions, to the exclusion of most of the important questions and study
designs in modern epidemiology, such as the effects of genetic vari-
ants, the study of ethnic and gender disparities and the use of study de-
signs that do not closely mirror randomized controlled trials (RCTs).
Furthermore, the concepts and methods are painted as being poten-
tially highly misleading even within this narrow range in which they
are deemed applicable. We believe that most of VBP’s and KDS’s criti-
cisms stem from a series of misconceptions about the approach they
criticize. In this response, therefore, we aim first to paint a more ac-
curate picture of the formal causal inference approach, and then to
outline the key misconceptions underlying VBP’s and KDS’s critiques.
KDS in particular criticize directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), using three
examples to do so. Their discussion highlights further misconceptions
concerning the role of DAGs in causal inference, and so we devote the
third section of the paper to addressing these. In our Discussion we
present further objections we have to the arguments in the two papers,
before concluding that the clarity gained from adopting a rigorous
framework is an asset, not an obstacle, to answering more reliably a
very wide range of causal questions using data from observational
studies of many different designs.
An introduction to the formal approach to
quantitative causal inference in epidemiology
Labels
VBP characterize the mainstream view within what they
call the ‘causal inference movement in epidemiology’ as be-
longing to the ‘restricted potential outcomes approach’,
which they define to be the approach in which only the ef-
fects of exposures that correspond to currently humanly
feasible interventions can be studied. KDS focus instead on
DAGs (rather than potential outcomes) as the main target
of their criticism. However, in many places they appear to
(wrongly) conflate DAGs and potential ouctomes, and
they certainly share the misconception that only currently
humanly feasible interventions can be studied within this
approach.
As we discuss later (see misconception 1), we strongly
disagree with this characterization. We also don’t much like
the term ‘movement’, and so—for want of a better label,
and to avoid cumbersome repetitive descriptions—we’ll call
the school of thought that both VBP and KDS have in their
sight the ‘Formal Approach to quantitative Causal inference
in Epidemiology’, or FACE. In the next sections we describe
what we see as the core principles of this approach, with ex-
amples of where these have been illuminating and enabled
causal analyses under less restrictive assumptions.
The core principles of the FACE
The broad features that characterize the majority of the work
done by the FACE are, having first thought carefully about
the nature of the causal question to be addressed, to convert
this into a precise quantity to be estimated (i.e. a causal esti-
mand), typically using the notation of potential outcomes.
The causal question one ideally wishes to address may often
be replaced by a similar causal question that can more feas-
ibly be addressed given the constraints of the data at hand.
There is a trade-off here. No one wants ‘the right answer to
entirely the wrong question’; indeed, this is what has led the
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FACE to recommend against ‘retreating into the associational
haven’ but rather ‘to take the causal bull by the horns’.3 But
presumably equally uncontroversial is the observation that
‘an entirely wrong answer to the right question’ is also futile.
Arriving at a good compromise between these two competing
concerns is one of the many important tasks facing applied
researchers. Explicitly formulating the causal estimand may
seem like an obvious first step, but one that is often ignored
in applied practice where researchers may jump to modelling
associations and presenting their results in terms of, for ex-
ample, odds ratios or hazard ratios, while foregoing the more
interesting and concrete scientific questions such as ‘what
would the risk of this outcome be if one could eliminate the
exposure?’ This clarity moreover allows one to be rigorous
about the assumptions (e.g. consistency, conditional ex-
changeability and positivity) under which the estimand can
be identified from the data at hand, and then for flexible esti-
mation strategies to be developed that are valid under these
assumptions. Finally, tools are recommended to assess quan-
titatively the sensitivity of the results to plausible departures
from the assumptions, to aid interpretation, and to discuss
possible misinterpretation, of the results. In the
Supplementary material (available at IJE online) we give ex-
amples of causal estimands and describe the most commonly
invoked assumptions for their identification in the context of a
simplified investigation of the effect of maternal urinary tract
infections during pregnancy on low birthweight.
The advantages of adopting this approach
In many settings (problems involving time-dependent
confounding and mediation are good examples4–9), the
increased formality characteristic of the FACE has high-
lighted the implausibility of the assumptions (e.g. no ‘feed-
back’ between exposure and confounder) required for
standard analysis strategies to give meaningful answers to
the causal questions being posed, and has led to improved
alternatives (e.g. g-methods) that are increasingly widely
used in practice.10–13 The FACE has moreover given rise to
an array of methods for nonlinear instrumental variable
analysis14–16 and for nonlinear mediation analysis9,17–23
where only ad hoc and biased approaches existed before.
Other examples where this approach has led to new in-
sights and/or methods include the low birthweight and
obesity ‘paradoxes’24–27 (see further discussion in
‘Example 2: Birthweight paradox’, below), the comparison
of dynamic regimes,28 the impact of measurement
error,29,30 noncompliance in clinical trials,31 distinguishing
confounding from non-collapsibility32 and many more.
More recently, and looking to the future, the advent of
omics technologies, electronic health records and other set-
tings that lead to high-dimensional data, means that ma-
chine learning approaches to data analysis will become
increasingly important in epidemiology. For this to be a suc-
cessful approach to drawing causal inferences from data, the
predictive modelling aspects (to be performed by the ma-
chine) must be separated from the subject matter consider-
ations, such as the specification of the estimand of interest,
and the encoding of plausible assumptions concerning the
structure of the data-generating process (to be performed by
humans). Whereas traditional epidemiological approaches
to the analysis of data naturally blur the two aspects, the
FACE makes the distinction explicit, and hence allows ma-
chine learning methods to be successfully employed.33
An enabling or a paralysing approach?
Its emphasis on definitions and assumptions has sometimes
given the false impression that the FACE is a ‘paralysing’
approach. How should the applied epidemiologist proceed
in settings where clear definitions are hard and assump-
tions are violated, but nevertheless quantitative causal in-
ference is needed? The advice that accompanies the theory
is pragmatic, for example:
The more precise we get the higher the risk of nonposi-
tivity in some subsets of the study population. In prac-
tice, we need a compromise.34
The emphasis is on adding to the statistical toolbox so
that a greater range of questions can be addressed under
less strict assumptions, and sensitivity analyses carried out
so that appropriate transparency and scepticism enter the
interpretation of results:
Methodology almost never perfectly corresponds to the
complex phenomena that give rise to our data.
Methodology within a field ought to advance in ex-
panding the range of questions that can be addressed, in
relaxing the assumptions required, and in allowing in-
vestigators to assess the sensitivity of conclusions to vio-
lations in the assumptions.35
The focus of causal enquiries in epidemiology
We contrast two statements:
Statement 1: Exposure E is a cause of disease D.
Statement 2: The effect of exposure E on disease D, ex-
pressed as a risk ratio, comparing exposure level 1 vs 0,
is 1.2, and this 20% increase in risk is (or is not) of suf-
ficient magnitude to be scientifically meaningful.
Recalling the extensive discussions at the turn of this cen-
tury on P-values vs confidence intervals,36–38 the consensus
among the epidemiological community—probably more so
than in any other scientific community—is that knowing
whether or not an exposure causes a disease (Statement 1) is
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less important than knowing whether or not an exposure
causes a disease to at least a minimally scientifically mean-
ingful extent (Statement 2). To be able to judge whether a
scientifically meaningful effect is attained, it should there-
fore be clear from the results of an epidemiological study: (i)
what is the meaning of the exposure; and (ii) what effect
size measure is being used. For example, to understand
statements such as ‘weight loss which was unintentional
or ill-defined was associated with excess risk of 22 to
39%’,39 one needs to understand the distribution of
weight loss.
We believe that some of the apparent discrepancies be-
tween the philosophical and epidemiological standpoints
on causality stem from a failure to acknowledge the differ-
ence between the two statements above, and the different
levels of care and detail required when inferring such state-
ments from data. It is well-known in many settings that ef-
fect estimation requires additional assumptions on top of
what is required for testing the causal null hypothesis, for
example methods that use instrumental variables.40
Misconceptions about the FACE
in VBP and KDS
There are three main shared misconceptions on which VBP
and KDS build their arguments. We discuss each in turn
below.
Misconception 1: The dominant view in the FACE
is that hypothetical interventions must be
currently humanly feasible
This idea is central to much of VBP’s and KDS’s criticisms
of the FACE, but we do not believe it to be a correct charac-
terization of the dominant views within the field. The FACE
advocates having in mind hypothetical interventions that
are ideally (close to being) unambiguously defined, and this
is what is evident from the quotations chosen by VBP. We
do not agree with their deduction from these quotations
(nor do we interpret from the opinions expressed in the field
more generally) that these hypothetical interventions need
be currently humanly feasible, except of course when the
purpose of the investigation is to guide imminent practical
policy decisions. The statement by VBP on page 6, ‘in order
for an intervention to be well specified . . . it is not necessary
that the intervention can be done; there is a difference be-
tween specifying and doing’, is uncontentious in our view.
Sufficient specificity is the ideal, and not feasibility.
In spite of this, the work from the FACE makes explicit
that the results from a causal analysis relate to all hypo-
thetical interventions, whether feasible and/or unambigu-
ously defined or not, that—as well as the usual conditional
exchangeability assumptions—satisfy the so-called consist-
ency assumption. This includes all hypothetical interven-
tions which are non-invasive in the following sense: if they
were applied to set the exposure to some value x for all
subjects, they would not change the outcome in subjects
who happen to have that exposure level x, from what was
actually observed.
Furthermore, since consistency at an individual level can
be relaxed to a slightly weaker version of the same assump-
tion, Herna´n and VanderWeele41,42 show that it is possible
to proceed even when a single non-invasive hypothetical
intervention seems inconceivable, provided that a non-
invasive ensemble of hypothetical interventions is conceiv-
able. The exact form of this depends on the context but, for
example, it is often consistency in expectation given con-
founders; i.e. that if a hypothetical intervention were applied
to set the exposure to some value x for all subjects, this
would not change the conditional expectation of the out-
come given confounders in subjects who happen to have
that exposure level x, from the conditional expectation of
the observed outcome given confounders among these sub-
jects with exposure level x. For example, in an observational
study of the effects of obesity, the work by Herna´n and
VanderWeele41 shows how the interpretation of any causal
effect measure estimated from a typical observational study
pertains (under all other relevant assumptions) to a stochas-
tic complex hypothetical intervention that shifts the distri-
bution of many different obesity-related exposures.
Knowledge about the effects of such a hypothetical interven-
tion is of limited value for immediate practical policy deci-
sions, but is relevant for scientific understanding.
A growing body of work from the FACE is therefore
focused on epidemiologically important exposures for
which certainly no humanly feasible intervention is known,
and often no single non-invasive hypothetical intervention
could be conceived of for which the observational data are
informative. For example, Bekaert et al.43 investigate the
impact of hospital-acquired infection on mortality in critic-
ally ill patients, with the aim of estimating the intensive
care unit mortality risk that would have been observed had
all such infections been avoided. Their analysis aims to
give insight on how harmful these infections are, even
though no feasible intervention exists that could prevent
infection for all. By the consistency assumption, the au-
thors view their results as being informative about the net
effect of infection. This effect may differ from the effect of
an intervention to prevent infection, which—if it could be
designed—would likely do more than just prevent infec-
tion. Other exposures that have been recently studied in
this context are, for example, socioeconomic position,
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delirium in critically ill patients, weight change, viral clear-
ance and depression.44–50
Petersen and van der Laan51 discuss the feasibility and
specificity issue in a recent overview of the FACE, stating
that:
There is nothing in the structural causal model frame-
work that requires the intervention to correspond to a
feasible experiment … if, in addition to the causal as-
sumptions needed for identifiability, the investigator is
willing to assume that the intervention used to define
the counterfactuals corresponds to a conceivable and
well-defined intervention in the real world, interpret-
ation can be further expanded to include an estimate of
the impact that would be observed if that intervention
were to be implemented in practice.
Much of the recent work stemming from the FACE has
been dedicated to the study of mediation,9 in particular
using so-called natural direct and indirect effects. These ef-
fects have been criticized by some52 precisely because they
concern hypothetical interventions that are, by their
very definition, humanly unfeasible (irrespective of the
variables being studied); in other words, no randomized
experiment could even in principle be constructed
that would allow the estimation of these effects under as-
sumptions guaranteed to hold by design. The dominant
view within the FACE is that these effects, because of the
importance of the epidemiological questions they aim to
address, are worthy of our attention despite the very strong
unfeasibility of the hypothetical interventions they demand
be imagined.
Misconception 2: The FACE sees the RCT as the
best choice of study design for causal inference
In order to dispel this misconception, we start by propos-
ing what we believe the characteristics of the ideal study to
be, when inference about the total effect of a single (time-
fixed) exposure is the goal. By ‘ideal’ we mean the study
we would run if our concerns were only scientific, with no
regard whatsoever for practicality, ethics or cost. We be-
lieve that such a study would have (at least) the following
characteristics (and many more, of course):
i. no inclusion/exclusion criteria [so that the effect of the
exposure in a variety of different groups can be separ-
ately estimated, as well as standardized effects to dif-
ferent (sub-)populations if relevant];
ii. large sample size (also thereby ensuring a large number
of events if relevant);
iii. an unambiguously defined set of levels for the exposure
(often more than two if dose–response is of interest)
allocated at random;
iv. long follow-up (so that short-, medium- and long-term
effects can all be separately estimated);
v. rich baseline covariate data (so that effect modification
can be explored);
vi. and no attrition, other forms of missing data, noncom-
pliance or measurement error.
It is true that point (iii) says that the ideal study would be
randomized (hence the fact that the FACE often talks of
‘the idealised randomized experiment’), but does this imply
that realistic RCTs are necessarily to be viewed as better
than realistic observational studies for causal inference?
No; because observational studies in practice are more
likely to get closer to points (i), (ii), (iv) and often also (v).
The ideal study, which has as one of its characteristics that
it is randomized, is in some respects closer to a realistic
RCT and in other ways closer to a realistic observational
study. Only by knowing the specific context can a judge-
ment be made on which is better for that context, if indeed
both are feasible, ethical and practical. In many settings,
when a RCT would be unfeasible, the FACE advocates
having in mind the ideal (randomized) study, merely as a
mental device to ensure that the observational study is de-
signed and analysed in the most sensible fashion. This is
even more valuable in complex longitudinal studies such as
those that attempt to determine the optimal dynamic deci-
sion strategy.53,54
Since a key difference between a realistic observational
study and the ideal study above is that (iii) doesn’t hold, a
major focus of the methods arising from the FACE is how
the realistic observational study can be analysed in such a
way that it emulates the ideal study with respect to (iii). This
does not equate to the view that the FACE strives to analyse
realistic observational studies in such a way that the results
obtained are close to those that would have been obtained
from a realistic RCT on the same exposure. The ultimate
aim is to analyse realistic observational studies in such a
way that the results obtained are close to those that would
have been obtained from the ideal study, one feature of
which is that the exposure is randomized. These two aims
are different, and an investigation of this difference led to
important insights regarding the hormone replacement ther-
apy (HRT) controversy by Herna´n et al.55 Taken out of con-
text, the title of the article by Herna´n et al. ‘Observational
studies analyzed like randomized experiments’ could
wrongly be taken to strengthen this misconception, that:
Proponents of [the FACE] assume and promote the pre-
eminence of the randomized controlled trial (RCT)
for assessing causality; other study designs (i.e. observa-
tional studies) are then only considered valid and
relevant to the extent that they emulate RCTs. [VBP,
page 2]
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On the contrary, Herna´n et al. were not advocating that
observational studies should be analysed like randomized
experiments. Note that the same lead authors have written
articles with the following titles: ‘Randomized trials ana-
lyzed like observational studies’56 and ‘Observational stud-
ies analyzed like randomized trials, and vice versa’.57
Herna´n et al. dropped many years of follow-up from their
data, together with many subjects who would not have
met the trial’s eligibility criteria, and ignored the informa-
tion they had on treatment discontinuation, in order to
emulate the intent-to-treat analysis performed in the RCT:
it would be madness to advocate any of these measures as
the best analysis of the observational data. Rather, Herna´n
et al’s aim was merely to show that if one did analyse the
observational study so as closely to mimic a randomized
trial, the contradiction between the results from the RCT
and observational studies would be nearly eliminated.This
served to challenge the dominant view at the time that the
contradiction was due to unmeasured confounding in the
observational studies. Incidentally, this work by Herna´n
et al. on the HRT controversy is an example of hypothesis
elimination, as advocated by VBP and KDS. As further evi-
dence that this misconception is unfounded, we refer here
to the large body of work from the FACE on the analysis
of data from retrospective study designs (e.g. case–control
studies).58–71
Misconception 3: The FACE believes that sex, race
and genes can’t be causes; furthermore (in KDS)
that racism can’t be a cause
Sex, race, sexism and racism as causes
This issue, particularly with respect to race, has been the
source of recent controversy72 in part in response to
VanderWeele and Herna´n,73 and VanderWeele and
Robinson.74 We see this controversy (‘is race a cause’?) as
something of a storm in a teacup as far as epidemiology is
concerned, brought about perhaps by the different focuses
that philosophers and epidemiologists have when it comes to
causality (note that both Glymour and Glymour72 and VBP,
which has two joint lead authors, have philosophers as lead
authors, and KDS also refer extensively to the philosophical
literature on causality). Referring back to Statements 1 and
2 given earlier, philosophers tend to concern themselves
with the meaning of statements of type 1, whereas epidemi-
ologists are more concerned with statements of type 2 and—
very importantly—whether or not it is justified to make a
statement such as statement 2 from the data at hand. It
would be very strange to claim that sex and race cannot be
considered in place of E in Statement 1. However, using
them in place of E in Statement 2 requires some care.
It is the dominant view within the FACE (and we agree)
that asserting that ‘this group of Caucasians would have
had a 20% lower risk of disease D had they been Afro-
Caribbean’ is meaningful only if the statement’s readers
share a near to common understanding of what ‘had they
been Afro-Caribbean’ means, and evidently this requires
further details. In the counterfactual world are they to be
Afro-Caribbean from conception? And in what sense? Are
their genes hypothetically being switched for genes that are
drawn from the distribution of genes seen in Afro-
Caribbeans? Are they to be brought up in their biological
Caucasian families, or similar Afro-Caribbean families?
What constitutes similar? Again, the consistency (and con-
ditional exchangeability) assumption rules out many (or
all) of the above hypothetical interventions. In order to
understand which, further details must be specified, for ex-
ample whether the Afro-Caribbean study participants were
brought up in biological Caucasian families or not.
Why do we think that this is a storm in a teacup?
Because epidemiologists are rarely interested in what
would have happened to these males had they been fe-
males, nor in what would have happened to these
Caucasians had they been Afro-Caribbeans; rather, they
are interested in one of three possible things: (i) sex and
race as effect modifiers; (ii) describing gender and ethnic
inequalities, and then in seeing what can be done to reduce
them which, as VanderWeele and Robinson show, can be
done without needing to define hypothetical interventions
on sex/gender/race/ethnicity; or (iii) the effect of the per-
ception of race and sex, that is in the effect of racism and
sexism; this is what KDS talk about in their third example.
None of these requires defining hypothetical interventions
on sex/gender/race/ethnicity. For (iii), the hypothetical
intervention would be on the perception of race/sex, rather
than on race/sex itself.75
We stress that the FACE is not saying that studying sex
and race is not important; evidently these factors are cen-
tral to many important epidemiological research questions.
The ‘alarm’ that KDS feel follows precisely from the confu-
sion that ensues when causal inference is too informally
discussed; they have misconstrued the observation made by
the FACE that it is difficult to answer the question of
‘what would happen if we changed sex/race’ and that in
any case we are more likely interested in one of (i), (ii) or
(iii) above, as saying that we should not study sex and race
(or even sexism and racism) at all. They write, ‘One alarm-
ing feature of [the FACE] is the re-appearance of previ-
ously rebutted causal claims that ‘race’ [. . .] cannot be a
‘cause’ because it is not ‘modifiable’’, before going on to
explain that it is the effect or racism, rather than the effect
of race, that is of interest to them.
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It can be seen from the applied literature on investiga-
tions of ethnicity, for example, that these investigations are
indeed described using associational (not causal) language,
for example:
Ma¯ori and Pacific infants were twice as likely
as European infants to have a mother who was
obese … ethnic differences in overweight were less
pronounced.76
The same is seen when sex/gender is studied. For ex-
ample, in the recently published UK Chief Medical
Officers’ guidelines on safe alcohol drinking,77 gender
played a key role. The committee of experts reviewed a
large body of evidence on the causal effect of alcohol
consumption on health outcomes, in men and women sep-
arately, and concluded that the guidelines on safe con-
sumption limits should be the same for both genders. This
was based on a study of effect modification by gender.78
Such effect modification is associational with respect to
gender (but causal with respect to alcohol consumption).
The pertinent question in this context did not therefore re-
quire imagining hypothetical interventions on gender.
States, including genes, as causes
VBP discuss the FACE’s view of statements such a
‘100 000 deaths annually are attributable to obesity’ and
correctly characterize one of the FACE’s objections to this
statement as stemming from its vagueness. The statement
implies something along the lines of had there been no
obesity, there would have been 100 000 fewer deaths annu-
ally, or were we hypothetically to eradicate obesity, there
would be 100 000 fewer deaths annually. As discussed by
Herna´n and Taubman,79 the words in italics are ambigu-
ous; for example have those who have hypothetically lost
weight lost weight from their waist, or their hips or both,
and if so in what combination? Current evidence from car-
diovascular epidemiology suggests that the consequences
of these different possibilities would be different. Once
more, the consistency assumption helps to resolve this am-
biguity, but understanding its implications requires a de-
tailed appreciation of the distribution of obesity-related
exposures in the study population, as discussed by Herna´n
and VanderWeele.41,42
What is relevant to the current misconception, in par-
ticular in relation to genes as exposures, is the following
characterization of the FACE given by VBP on page 6.
They extrapolate from the issue concerning obesity and
conclude that under the precepts of the FACE:
‘States’ like obesity (or hypercholesterolaemia, hyper-
tension, carrying BRCA1 or BRCA2, male gender) can
no longer be seen as causes.
Thus, they have concluded that the FACE believes that
the causal effects of genes (along with many other things)
cannot be studied. We strongly oppose this conclusion.
Hypothetical interventions on body mass index (BMI) are
too ambiguous (to imagine an obese person as not obese,
there are many other changes that need also be imagined,
and a myriad possibility for these) unless one elaborates
further. However, the idea that a mutation in the BRCA1
gene inherited at meiosis could instead hypothetically not
have been inherited, although currently unfeasible to im-
plement, is sufficiently well-specified. This is so in the sense
that imagining that all other inherited genes and all envir-
onmental conditions at the time of meiosis remain the
same as in the actual world, would reasonably suffice for
the hypothetical intervention to be non-invasive. There are
many instances in the key texts cited by VBP, KDS and be-
yond where the causal effects of genetic variants are dis-
cussed by the FACE.67,69,80–84
Further misconceptions in KDS about the
role of DAGs in causal inference
The description by KDS of the role played by DAGs in
causal inference is counter to what is written in the key
textbooks and papers in this area, and counter to what is
taught in introductory courses to causal inference. We
start, therefore, by clarifying the role of DAGs in causal in-
ference, before pointing out the key misconception that
underlies many of KDS’s criticisms. We end this section by
pointing out further errors in their discussion of the DAGs
relating to their three examples.
DAGs in statistics
As used generally in statistics, DAGs are pictorial represen-
tations of conditional independences. The absence of an
arrow between two nodes in a DAG is used to represent
conditional independence between the two variables repre-
sented by these two nodes, conditional on the variables
represented by the nodes’ parents in the graph; let us call
these conditional independences ‘local’. The advantage of
representing local conditional independences graphically is
that ‘global’ conditional independence statements (i.e. con-
ditional independences between two variables given sets
other than those represented by the nodes’ parents in the
graph) can be deduced from the local conditional inde-
pendences used to construct the graph, via an algorithm
known as d-separation.85
DAGs in causal inference
DAGs are appealing for causal inference since the causal
effects of interest can be characterized in terms of specific
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conditional dependencies between exposure and outcome.
DAGs provide insight as to which conditional dependences
characterize the effect of interest, by elucidating the causal
structures that would render exposure and outcome condi-
tionally dependent. Causal structures are here implied by
the data-generating mechanism, which involves informa-
tion on the direction of causal effects, the absence of com-
mon causes between variables, the absence of direct effects
between variables and study design. Such information,
which is not contained in the data but may be available
from subject-matter knowledge, can be encoded in the
causal DAG.
The DAGs used in causal inference can be interrogated
(using d-separation, after some slight manipulation, e.g.
removing arrows emanating from exposure, or construct-
ing the corresponding single world intervention graph
(SWIG)) to see if, for example, a given set of variables is
sufficient to adjust for confounding given the assumptions
encoded in the causal DAG. DAGs have thus proved very
useful in this process since humans are well-known to have
poor probabilistic intuition about the consequences of con-
ditioning or adjusting. By explicitly visualizing the conse-
quences of conditioning, DAGs help to circumvent the
intuitive errors that might happen when this process is at-
tempted informally.
We stress that the DAGs used in causal inference ex-
press a priori knowledge and hypotheses; see, for example,
the paper by Robins86 in which he shows how identical
data can be analysed in different ways, when guided by dif-
ferent causal DAGs, according to the different possible
study designs, questions of interest, and subject matter
knowledge that underpin/accompany these data.
Misconceptions regarding DAGs in KDS
In the light of the above clarifications, it is now possible to
address KDS’s criticisms of DAGs. They point out many
times that data alone are not sufficient to arrive at the
DAG nor at causal inferences (‘data never speak by them-
selves’). This is indisputable, and is precisely why DAGs
are useful in causal inference: to make the assumptions
based on a priori knowledge explicit, and to facilitate the
translation of a priori knowledge into a suitable statistical
analysis. They write that ‘there is no short cut for hard
thinking about the biological and social realities and proc-
esses that jointly create the phenomena we epidemiologists
seek to explain’, and we agree. Causal DAGs don’t purport
to provide such a short cut; the causal DAG is the result of
the hard thinking, not a substitute for it, and the short cut
provided is via d-separation, which enters the next step in
helping the transition from the result of this hard thinking
to a sensible statistical analysis. Many of their criticisms
are along similar lines and follow from the same underly-
ing confusion, for example when they write, ‘Nor can a
DAG provide insight into what omitted variables might be
important’. We agree of course: it is the background know-
ledge that leads to the DAG, and not vice versa.
On page 9, KDS indicate that the world is too compli-
cated to hope to understand all the relevant causes of the
exposure in question (‘one would need infinite knowledge,
after all, to generate an exhaustive list’) and we, once
more, agree. However, the many examples from the FACE
have demonstrated that even when the DAGs are unavoid-
ably simplistic, they do provide much insight into the
biases inherent in certain statistical analyses.87
KDS’s examples
We found the discussion by KDS of their three examples
rather difficult to follow, precisely since the DAGs they al-
lude to are not drawn. This in itself points to the usefulness
of DAGs for clarity of thought and communication in these
settings.
Example 1: Pellagra
In Figure 1, we have drawn a DAG capturing KDS’s dis-
cussion of the pellagra example. KDS describe the two
leading hypotheses (germs and contaminated food) as con-
taining the same elements but with arrows ‘that pointed
in entirely opposite directions’. We don’t believe this to
correspond to their description nor to the plausible rela-
tionships involved. In the ‘germ theory’, those with a high
infection rate were believed to be more likely to be institu-
tionalized, but it would not be plausible that the infection
caused institutionalization; rather, both would share com-
mon causes (depicted by U in our diagram) such as pov-
erty (and hence the capitalism hypothesis is also
depicted). In the remaining hypotheses they describe, there
is a causal effect of institutionalization on pellagra infec-
tion, but via different potential mediators: contaminated
food, stress and vitamin B3 deficiency. Each hypothesis
Figure 1. A casual DAG representing all the hypotheses discussed by
KDS in relation to the effect of institutionalisation on pellagra infection.
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introduces a new element(s) into the DAG and all can be
depicted in a single DAG, as we have done in Figure 1; no
reversal of any arrows is involved. Of course, subject mat-
ter knowledge is needed to reach the DAG, and data ana-
lysis is then required to evaluate which are the strongest
pathways, in order to determine which hypothesis (or
hypotheses) is correct. The DAG in isolation is insufficient
for arriving at an explanation (or for ‘alone wagging the
causal tale’), of course, but we are unaware of claims to
the contrary.
Example 2: Birthweight paradox
Figure 2, which is the DAG alluded to by KDS in reference
to the birthweight paradox, shows that, even if we had
measured and adjusted for all confounders C of smoking
and infant mortality, as long as there exist unmeasured
common causes U of birthweight and infant mortality,
then a comparison of the mortality rates of low birth-
weight babies between smoking and non-smoking mothers
does not have a causal interpretation. This is because strat-
ifying on birthweight induces a correlation between smok-
ing and U, in such a direction that it could explain the
paradox. As VanderWeele writes in a recent review article
on this issue:88
The intuition behind this explanation is that low
birthweight might be due to a number of causes: one
of these might be maternal smoking, another might
be instances of malnutrition or a birth defect. If we
consider the low birthweight infants whose mothers
smoke, then it is likely that smoking is the cause of
low birthweight. If we consider the low birthweight
infants whose mothers do not smoke, then we know
maternal smoking is ruled out as a cause for low
birthweight, so that there must have been some other
cause, possibly something such as malnutrition or a
birth defect, the consequences of which for infant
mortality are much worse. By not controlling for the
common causes (U) of low birthweight and infant
mortality, we are essentially setting up an unfair com-
parison between the smoking and non-smoking moth-
ers. If we could control for such common causes, the
paradoxical associations might go away.
VanderWeele chooses malnutrition and birth defects
as possible Us, whereas KDS choose ‘harms during their
fetal development unrelated to and much worse than those
imposed by smoking, e.g. stochastic semi-disasters that
knock down birthweight as a result of random genetic or
epigenetic abnormalities affecting the sperm or egg prior to
conception or arising during fertilization and embryogen-
esis’. Is this not just a biologically more detailed descrip-
tion of the sort of phenomenon involved in the
development of a birth defect, in which malnutrition could
also play a part? In other words, the ‘DAG explanation’
and KDS’s explanation are almost the same, and indeed,
since the ‘DAG explanation’ only posits that such a U
may exist, it subsumes KDS’s slightly more detailed ex-
planation. We don’t understand their claim, therefore, that
the former explanation is incorrect, while the latter is
‘lovely’.
Their comment that, having identified the potential for
collider bias in a DAG, ‘it is another matter entirely, how-
ever, to elucidate empirically, whether the hypothesized
biases do indeed exist and if they are sufficient to generate
the observed associations’ is of course entirely unconten-
tious. This is precisely why, having identified the possibil-
ity that the paradox could be explained in this way, the
FACE went on to evaluate whether or not plausible magni-
tudes for the effects of such U on birthweight and infant
mortality would suffice to explain the reported paradox-
ical associations.25,89,90
In summary, DAGs are neither the beginning (they
arise from subject matter knowledge) nor the end (they
guide the subsequent data analysis and/or sensitivity ana-
lyses), but neither has the FACE made claims to this
effect.
Example 3: Racism
As we discussed under Misconception 3 above, KDS are
in agreement with the FACE in their discussion of their
third example, since hypothetical interventions on racism
don’t suffer from any of the specification problems that
accompany hypothetical interventions on race discussed
above and in the literature that they criticize. Rather
than saying that the FACE is ‘bark[ing] up the wrong
tree, and indeed miss[ing] the forest entirely’, KDS
should surely aim this criticism at their fellow critics of
the FACE, such as VBP, who are the ones advocating
studying the causal effects of race and sex; the FACE
has merely outlined the difficulties in doing so, and en-
tirely agrees that it is unlikely to be the true question of
interest.
Figure 2. A casual DAG for the ‘birthweight paradox’.
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Discussion
Formality and non-invasive
hypothetical interventions
In view of the difficulties of making causal enquiries based
on observational data, epidemiologists have historically
tended to speak only of associations. VBP rightly say that
the FACE has been a response to this ‘retreat to the associ-
ational haven’. Although prudence is imperative, inciden-
tally, this ‘retreat’ has tended to result in a lack of prudence
in data analysis. Indeed, since essentially all statistical ana-
lyses are designed to measure associations, adjusted or not,
the lack of a formal framework makes it impossible to dis-
tinguish clearly between analysis strategies that target the
envisaged causal enquiry from those that do not. The unfor-
tunate result has been reflected in analysis strategies that
tend to induce bias, even in the ideal setting where all rele-
vant confounding variables are perfectly measured.4–7
To be able to identify, from across the many possible as-
sociations between exposure and outcome that one could
measure, the one that targets the causal enquiry at stake, the
FACE has adopted the notion of hypothetical interventions.
Using such hypothetical interventions, effect measures of
interest can be clearly expressed, identifying assumptions
can be explicated and analysis strategies developed that are
valid when these assumptions are met. The FACE thus
merely aims to provide a principled framework under which
causal enquiries can be approached. It does not eschew the
many sources of epidemiological information, such as time
trend data, retrospective designs, negative controls etc., but
rather aims to understand under what conditions such infor-
mation enables causal enquiries to be answered; there are
examples of this work by the FACE in relation to time trend
data and negative controls.91–97 In addition, it aims to cau-
tion epidemiologists that a good understanding of a reported
effect requires a specific understanding of the exposure and
considered effect measure.
Adopting the specific interventionist framework as a
philosophy, we have argued that the formality that under-
lies the FACE does not require the existence of humanly
feasible interventions, as it targets ‘non-invasive interven-
tions’ in the sense implied by the consistency assumption.
We believe that many epidemiological enquiries, except
those that aim to evaluate the impact of public health inter-
ventions, implicitly have such interventions in mind.
Alternative frameworks
A number of causal theories have attempted to move away
from the mainstream approach as described above, by not
using potential outcomes.99–101 Some of these, in particu-
lar the decision-theoretical framework, have been useful in
highlighting some strong assumptions entailed in
approaches based on potential outcomes, particularly
when joint or nested counterfactuals are involved. The
decision-theoretical framework adheres to the same prin-
ciples (one might argue even more strongly) of clearly ex-
pressing the causal target of estimation and the
assumptions under which this can be identified. Indeed, in
terms of data analysis, the decision-theoretical approach
reproduces existing results from the potential outcomes ap-
proach, and we view it as a part of the FACE. Other causal
theories, in their attempt to avoid potential outcomes, have
tended to be less explicit, thereby obscuring and eventually
ignoring certain selection biases. VBP and KDS similarly
recommend that other philosophical frameworks for caus-
ality be adopted in epidemiology. We hope that their alter-
natives, which are not sufficiently specific to be fully
evaluated, will not run into the same difficulties.
Both VBP and KDS mention the need for the synthesis
of evidence across multiple studies and settings. We agree
with this, and view the concepts and methods of the FACE
as aiding rather than impeding this endeavour, in two
ways: (i) more reliable causal analyses of the individual
studies contributing to a synthesis improves the reliability
of the synthesized conclusion; and (ii) by being clear what
question is being addressed, and under what assumptions
the analysis strategy used can be deemed successful, evi-
dence from different studies can be more reliably com-
bined. We cite a recent example of where a meta-analysis
came to suspect conclusions based on shortcomings in
both these aspects.102
VBP and KDS suggest the analysis of time trend data, the
use of negative controls and the elimination of alternative
hypotheses, but as we have discussed, these are already done
within the FACE.91–97 Arguably, the vast section of the
FACE literature dedicated to sensitivity analyses has at its
core the elimination (or at least consideration or evaluation)
of alternative hypotheses. A novel approach to the elimin-
ation of alternative hypotheses is described by Rosenbaum.98
VBP also imply that Pearl’s framework [specifically non-
parametric structural equation models (NPSEM)]85 is more
amenable to epidemiological enquiries. Whereas of course
we view the NPSEM framework as belonging to the FACE, it
is well-known that the NPSEM framework is more demand-
ing in terms of the assumptions it makes than alternative
frameworks within the FACE.103 These are specifically as-
sumptions similar to consistency. Instead of making the con-
sistency assumption only with respect to hypothetical
interventions on the exposure, the NPSEM assumptions
imply consistency with respect to hypothetical interventions
on every variable in the causal diagram. We fail to follow
therefore why VBP might be prepared to accept this more
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restrictive sub-framework while viewing the larger frame-
work that contains it as too restrictive.
Historical success stories
Both VBP and KDS draw attention to a few historical ex-
amples from epidemiology’s past in which successful causal
inferences were achieved without the formality advocated by
the FACE. We should be cautious of basing future strategy
on these ‘cherry-picked’ success stories, without mentioning
the numerous failures. Indeed, a similar reasoning would
lead one to conclude that science does not need a formal de-
ductive theory at all, since there are obviously many ex-
amples, e.g. in prehistoric times, where science and
knowledge acquisition progressed without formal theories.
The logical error in this reasoning is that no consideration is
given to the many examples where plain intuition and infor-
mal deduction have been misleading. This does not mean
that informal approaches have no value; they should and do
guide the design of studies and statistical analysis, but object-
ive science eventually calls for a formal theory and approach.
We view the FACE as precisely offering formal tools to
investigate cause–effect relationships. They are always
guided by what KDS call IBE (inference to the best explan-
ation). Indeed, IBE is often how one comes to investigate the
specific cause–effect relationship in the first place. Given
how associations can be distorted in complicated ways due
to implicit/explicit conditioning or not conditioning, and
how intuition, for example in mediation analysis and instru-
mental variable methods, breaks down as soon as nonlinear
relationships are at play, there is no question in our opinion
that a formal theory is needed to guide data analysis.
Concluding thoughts
Throughout its history, aspects of the FACE have been
misconceived by some. Its tendency to be explicit about as-
sumptions has often been misunderstood as if this frame-
work needs more assumptions than traditional
alternatives. This has then led people to use ‘associational
analyses’ instead, the conclusions from which they eventu-
ally interpret causally, where causal interpretation is only
justified under even stronger assumptions.
These papers by VBP and KDS highlight further miscon-
ceptions which, if true, would mean that many important
exposures would be excluded from being studied within the
FACE framework and many tools, such as causal DAGs, re-
jected as misleading. In this response, we have attempted to
correct these misconceptions and, while stressing the clarity
that comes from having a rigorous framework based on
clear definitions and assumptions, we have highlighted the
pragmatic considerations that should and do accompany the
theory when applied in practice, together with the central
role played by subject matter knowledge. We are glad to
learn about these concerns, and to be able to clarify that the
FACE does not refute epidemiological questions that cannot
be linked to humanly feasible interventions, nor epidemiolo-
gical designs that cannot emulate aspects of randomized
studies, and nor does it claim that graphical or statistical
methods lessen the importance of subject matter knowledge.
Rather, the FACE aims to provide insight on what can be
learned about these questions and from these designs under
the most plausible assumptions possible, given the data, de-
sign and subject matter knowledge at hand.
As Herna´n104 concluded in a recent debate on similar
issues, relating to whether or not left-truncated data can
meaningfully be used in causal inference:
Exceptions to this synchronizing of the start of follow-
up and the treatment strategies may be considered when
the only available data (or the only data that we can af-
ford) are left truncated. If we believe that analyzing
those data will improve the existing evidence for
decision-making, we must defend the use of left-
truncated data explicitly, rather than defaulting into
using the data without any justification.
We understand from this, and agree, that no data and
no questions are ‘off limits’ as long as the data are inform-
ative about the question. The core theme of the FACE is
that formality allows one to assess to what extent the data
at hand are informative about a particular question given
subject matter knowledge. A rejection of this framework in
favour of an alternative would either mean that the new
framework could do away with the need to link the data to
the question, or that the required link would remain but in
an obscured and less explicit fashion. The former would be
miraculous, and the latter would increase the risk of confu-
sion and misinterpretation.
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